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Abstract
A provision's legal meaning is thought by many to be a function of its literal meaning. To
explain the appearance that lawyers are arguing over a provision's legal meaning and not
just over which outcome would be more prudent or morally preferable, some legal literalists
claim that a provision's literal meaning may be causally, rather than conventionally,
determined. I argue, first, that the proposed explanation is inconsistent with common
intuitions about legal meaning; second, that explaining legal disagreement as a function of
the causally determined meanings of moral terms requires, but lacks, a causal semantics
which is clearly consistent with the scope of moral disagreement. Finally, I suggest that an
element of the theory of language invoked by 'causal' legal literalists might be better
deployed as part oían intentionalist account of legal practice.
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Legal theorists seek, among other things, to explain the structure of
our practice of statutory interpretation. Many believe that a statute's legal
meaning is a function of its literal meaning, that is, of the various meanings
conventionally attributed to the terms adopted.'^  On this hypothesis.
* I would like to thank Leslie Green, Gerard Casey, Maria Baghramian, John O'Dowd and
Donal Coney for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
' '[T]he general words we use - like "vehicle" in the case I consider - must have some
standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its application. There must be a core of
settled meaning, but there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words
are neither obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out... in ajjplying legal rules, someone
must take the responsibility of deciding that words do or do not cover some case in hand
with all the practical consequences involved in this decision.' HLA Hart, 'Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals', Harvard Law Review 71 (1958), pp. 593-629, 607. Some theo-
rists hold that legal meaning is just a function of literal meaning, e.g., John Manning, The
Absurdity Doctrine', Harvard Law Review n6 (2003), pp. 2387-2486, 2391, '[R]espect for
the legislative process requires judges to adhere to the precise terms of statutory texts' and
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collective adherence to the statute book's literal meaning is what accounts,
in part anyway, for the striking agreement on the content of the law - the
countless 'easy cases'. Just as importantly, adherence to statutes' literal
meaning is consistent with the possibility of disagreement about the reso-
lution of a case. Thus, just as an utterance's literal meaning may be indeter-
minate, so may a statute's legal meaning. When it is, disagreement can be
expected over the morality and prudence of alternative legal outcomes.
Legal literalism thus promises to steer a steady course between the 'night-
mare' that judges are just legislators in robes, and the 'noble dream' that
judicial disagreements simply concern the law as it is.^
A persistent criticism of legal literalism is that it fails to account for judi-
cial disagreements which do concern the law as it is. If the legal meaning of
a statute consists in the conventional meanings of its words, and interpret-
ers are familiar with its words and their conventional meanings, how do we
explain the appearance that they are arguing over its legal meaning and not
just over which outcome would be more prudent or morally preferable? In
light of this criticism, some have proposed a very different sort of legal
literalism, one better equipped to explain the scope of legal disagreement.
These theorists continue to claim that a provision's legal meaning is a func-
tion of the meanings of its terms, but add that those meanings are often
causally, rather than conventionally, determined. We shall call this 'causal
legal semantics'.
precludes them 'from making ad hoc exceptions to generally worded laws'; Aileen Kavanagh,
'Original Intention, Enacted Text and Constitutional Interpretation', American Journal of
Jurisprudence 47 (2009), pp. 255-98, 275, '[T]he content of an authoritative directive con-
tained in the Constitution... must be contained in the text of the Constitution.'. Others hold
that legal meaning is a function of both literal meaning and the purposes for which the
statute was obviously enacted, a position which Hart himself adopted in response to Lon
Fuller's famous reply to his 1958 article: '[A] legal system often has other resources besides
the words used in the formulations of its rules which serve to determine their content or
meaning in particular cases. Thus... the obvious or agreed purpose of a rule may... serve to
show that words in the context of a legal rule may have a meaning different from that which
they have in other contexts.' Hart, Essays injurisprudence andPhilosophy (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1983), p. 8. See similarly, Wil Waluchow, 'Defeasibility and Legal Positivism', in J Ferrer
et al. (eds), Essays on Legal Defeasibility (Oxford University Press, forthcoming); Aharon
Barak, Purposive Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 80; Kent
Greenawalt, 'The Nature of Rules and the Meaning of Meaning' Notre Dame Law Review 72
(1998), pp. 1449-74,1472-3; Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1997) pp. 20-21.
^ HLA Hart, 'American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the
Noble Dream', Georgia Law Review 11 (1976), pp. 969-89.
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I argue, first, that causal legal semantics cannot account for common
intuitions about legal meaning; second, that explaining legal disagreement
as a function of the causally determined meanings of moral terms requires,
but lacks, a causal semantics which is clearly consistent with the scope of
moral disagreement. Having developed these criticisms, I suggest that an
element of the theory of language invoked by the new legal semantics
might be better deployed as part of a traditional intentionalist account of
legal practice.
The New Semantic Strategy
The. explanatory value to legal theory of the causal theory of reference stan-
dardly attributed to Saul Kripke^ has been defended in progressively greater
detail by Michael Moore,* David Brink^ and Nicos Stavropoulos.^ Scott
Soames, noted for his defence of an expansive reading of Kripke's work,^
has recently offered his own account of legal interpretation.^ Significantly,
Soames accepts the possible legal relevance of Kripkean semantics.^ It is
therefore timely to reassess the value of causal semantics for legal theory.
The causal theory of reference (CTR) states that a term's reference is not
determined by conventionally associated criteria or practices of usage but
by an act of baptism: term t refers to just whatever is in fact the same object
ä Kripke's 1970 Princeton lectures were first published as 'Naming and Necessity', in
Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman (eds.). Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1972) pp. 253-355.
* Moore, 'A Natural Law Theory of Legal Interpretation', Southem California Law Review
58 (1985). PP- 277-398; Moore, Educating Oneself In Public (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000) pp. 100-04,337-54-
5 E.g., Brink, 'Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review', Philosophy and
Public Affairs 17 (1988) 105-48; Brink, 'Legal Interpretation, Objectivity, and Morality', in Brian
Leiter (ed.). Objectivity in Law cmd Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)
pp. 12-65.
^ Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
' E.g., Soames, Reference and Description: The Case against Two-Dimensionalism
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).
8 Soames, 'Interpreting Legal Texts: What Is, and What Is Not, Special about the Law', in
Soames, Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2009) pp. 403-24.
^ As does Michael Devitt; '[Conventionalist semantics] places far too heavy an epistemic
burden on competent users of these words [including socio-legal words like "contract"] ...
None of these problems arise for the causal theory.' Devitt, 'Deference and the Use Theory',
ProtoSociology 27 (2ou) pp. 196-211,205.
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or kind as that baptized as 'i*. Soames describes CTR's application to natural
kind terms (terms such as 'water' and 'tiger') thus:
[A natural kind term's] meaning is the kind it names, and its reference is
determined by agreed upon instances, plus a special similarity relation,
holding between instances of the kind, the specific content of which needn't
be known, even by competent speakers.'"
Seminal work by Kripke, Keith Donnellan" and Hilary Putnam'^ has sug-
gested to many philosophers that, at least with respect to proper names and
natural kind terms, CTR fits our linguistic intuitions better than theories
which claim that reference is determined by usage or associated descrip-
tions. Admittedly, even with respect to such kinds of terms, CTR faces a
variety of complications.'^ We overlook those issues here; causal legal
semantics faces special difficulties.
The major attraction of CTR for legal theorists is its potential to explain
the scope of legal disagreement.'* Applying CTR to the interpretation of a
statutory provision, it follows that A'is subject to the provision if and only if
A'is relevantly similar to agreed upon instances of a kind denoted by a term
with which the provision is written. As the content of the similarity relation
'" Soames, Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It p. 406. Moore offers a
non-canonical understanding of CTR, according to which, baptizers' paradigms need not be
instances of the kind baptized: '[P]aradigms may turn out not to be instances of the kind at
all ... [T]he baptizers need [only] have before them puzzlingly similar particulars from
which they self-consciously hypothesize a kind ...' Moore, 'Can Objectivity be Grounded in
Semantics?', in Enrique Villanueva (ed.). Law: Metaphysics, Meaning, and Objectivity
(Amsterdam: Rodopi Philosophical Studies, 2007) pp. 235-62, 254-56. It is unclear how the
existence of a kind may be hypothesized from particulars none of which need be an instance
of the kind. It is equally unclear how one might measure progress toward uncovering the
relevant similarity relation.
" Donnellan, 'Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions', Synthese 21 (1970), pp. 335-58.
'^ Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning', in K. Gundersen, (ed.) Language, Mind and
Knowledge (Minnesota: University of Minnesota, 1975), pp. 131-93.
'^ Such as how exactly to account for reference change; Gareth Evans, 'The Causal Theory
of Names', Aristotelian Society Supplementary 47 (1973) 187-225; how a single kind is isolated
in baptism; John Dupré, 'Natural Kinds and Biological Taxa', Philosophical Review 90 (1981)
pp. 66-90; and the possible absence of a common element in the causal production of a
range of features belonging to a set of samples; Kyle Stanford & Philip Kitcher, 'Refining
the Causal Theory of Reference for Natural Kind Terms' Philosophical Studies 97 (2000)
pp. 99-129.
'" See Stavropoulos, Objectivity in Law, p. 5. See also, Ronald Dworkin, 'Hart's Postscript
and the Character of Political Philosophy', Oxfordjoumal of Legal Studies 24 (2004) pp. 1-37,
11-13 (but see Dworkin,yusi/ce in Robes (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2006)
11-12 and Brian Bix, 'Global Error and Legal Truth', Oxfordjoumal of Legal Studies 29 (2009)
PP- 535-47. 545-47)-
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holding between agreed upon instances of the denoted kind may be
misunderstood, the fact that a statutory term conventionally refers to X
is neither necessary nor sufficient for X to count as legal (or illegal).'^
Accordingly, disagreement over a provision's legal meaning may be
expected even among interpreters familiar with its terms' conventional
meanings.
Some legal disagreements concern the implications of statutes written
in moral language, statutes regulating that which is 'due' or 'cruel'. Moore
et al. explain such disagreement as a product of the interpretive effort
to establish the causally determined meanings of these terms. For instance,
the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution prohibits the imposition of
'cruel and unusual' punishments. If the Amendment's legal meaning
depends on the reference of the term, 'cruel', and the latter is a function
of a similarity relation whose content may be unknown, then whether
the Amendment prohibits, say, capital punishment, is something about
which there could be meaningfial disagreement. Should the authors of the
Bill of Rights, or anyone else, misapprehend the content of the similar-
ity relation holding between instances of the moral kind 'cruelty', they
stand to be corrected, and with it their understanding of the Eighth
Amendment.
We turn now to the first objection to the use of Kripkean semantics in
legal theory: its inability to account for common intuitions about legal
meaning.
Literal Meaning as Legal Meaning
The answers to most legal questions seem obvious. Some seem obvious
even after apparent mistakes about the literal meaning of enacted terms
have come to light. Stephen Munzer soon suggested that this phenomenon
confiicts with causal legal semantics:
Once upon a time people began to be concerned about the overharvesting of
the creatures of the sea. Accordingly, the legislature enacted a statute ... "No
boat or vessel shall remove more than 20 tons of fish per year from the fishing
areas described below."... It turns out that when the legislature passed the
statute, it was universally believed that whales were fish... A committee report
'5 Paraphrasing Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, 'Different Kinds of Kind Terms', Philosophical
Issues 8 (1997), pp. 313-23,317-
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on the statute indicates that the legislature was concerned about the ...
overharvesting offish, including... whales.'^
We are invited to agree that, intuitively, the taking of more than 20 tons of
whale in a given year is illegal. Yet whales are mammals, not fish. Arguably,
CTR has a good story to tell of how we once thought that the term 'fish'
referred to whales and now do not - something about how, having improved
our understanding of the shared nature of certain paradigm 'fish', we came
to realize that their nature is not shared by whales. That story is clearly
unavailable to explain our intuitive interpretation of the statute, since, not-
withstanding our improved comprehension of the reference offish', we still
think that it regulates whaling. But then, if outcomes known to be entailed
by a provision's literal meaning may be counter-intuitive, a simple explana-
tion of legal meaning as literal meaning is equally unavailable. Munzer thus
presents a critical challenge to causal legal semantics.'^ Three ways of meet-
ing it have been suggested. We assess each in tum.
Literal Meaning as a Weighted Contribution to Legal Meaning
One response to Munzer's hypothetical is to claim that we treat an enact-
ment's literal meaning as but one, out-weighable component of its legal
meaning. Thus, Brink and Moore suggest that a statute's legal meaning also
depends, in part, on its purpose. Due attention to legislative purpose might
demand a legal outcome other than that which is hterally entailed. Brink
concludes, 'since appeal to underlying purpose can override semantic con-
tent, if these conflict, my interpretive view allows the interpretive conclu-
sion that [whaling is indeed regulated]'.'^ In the event of conflict, Brink
'^ Stephen Munzer, 'Realistic Limits on Realist Interpretation' Southern California Law
Review 58 (1985) pp. 459-75.469-
" A challenge readily reconstructed on historical premises: A tenth branch of the King's
ordinary revenue, said to be grounded on the consideration of his guarding and protecting
of the seas from pirates and robbers, is the right to roya\ fish, which are whale and sturgeon:
and these, whether either thrown ashore, or caught near the coasts, are the property of the
King... [This right] is expressly claimed and allowed in the statute de praerogativa regis [17
Edw. II Ch. II (1325)].' William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws ofEngiand (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1765), Book 1 Ch 8 para 10 (emphasis added). I am grateful to Donal
Coffey for bringing this provision to my attention.
'8 D Brink, 'Semantic and Legal Interpretation (Further Thoughts)', Canadian joumai
of Law & jurisprudence 2 (1989) pp. 181-91, 186; similarly. Brink, 'Legal Interpretation,
Objectivity and Morality' pp. 25-26, 60 n 39; Moore, 'A Natural Law Theory of Legal
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suggests choosing the legal outcome most coherent with, 'existing legal
principles, constitutional provisions, statutes, and precedents'.'^
Brink's suggested resolution of potential conflicts would require inter-
preters to know the legal meaning of 'existing constitutional provisions,
statutes', etc. If, however, a provision's legal meaning is a function of both its
literal meaning and legislative purpose, the legal meaning of the statute
book's other provisions is similarly a function of both their literal meanings
and legislative purposes. Until we know how to resolve conflicts between
these factors, we will be unable to attribute legal meanings to the system's
other provisions in order that we may discern the legal outcome most
coherent therewith. Referring the interpreter to the legal meanings of other
provisions thus leaves him no closer to resolving conflict between a provi-
sion's legislative purpose and literal meaning. Yet, according to Munzer,
interpreters have no problem deciding that whaling is regulated. Brink may
present a causal legal semantics that is consistent with the intuitions
Munzer reveals, but it is poorly placed to explain them.
On Moore's account, in contrast, the weight of literal meaning and legis-
lative purpose is ultimately a moral matter, a function of the moral facts of
the case.2° Unfortunately, there is a suite of complications facing proposals
to explain a provision's legal meaning by reference to conflicting factors of
relative weight.
If the theorist offers a criterion according to which literal meaning,
legislative purpose and, say, the moral facts, each carry presei weights in the
determination of legal meaning, there is the distinct prospect of cases in
which a provision's literal meaning ought to be decisive but in fact implies
Interpretation' 384-85, 'A judge must check the provisional interpretation reached from
these ingredients [semantic meaning] with an idea of how well such an interpretation
serves the purpose of the rule in question... Less ordinary meaning, or a more strained read-
ing of statutory definitions and precedent, will be traded off against a better purpose'. Heidi
Hurd's 'non-communicative' theory of legislation, according to which statutes are 'natural
signs' of causally related empirical phenomena, appears to adopt a similar tack:
[A] non-communicative model of legislation would call upon courts to interpret a
statute by seeking to discover and to achieve the optimal state of affairs of which the
statute is a natural sign. This is no more than a long-winded way of saying the familiar:
that courts should interpret statutes in light of the purposes that they may best be
made to serve.
Hurd, 'Sovereignty in Silence' Yale Law Journal 99 (1990) pp. 945-1028,1028.
'^  Brink, 'Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review', p. 132 (referred to in
Brink, 'Semantic and Legal Interpretation (FurtherThoughts)', p. 188); similarly. Brink, 'Legal
Interpretation, Objectivity and Morality', pp. 33-34.
'^° Moore, 'A Natural Law Theory of Legal Interpretation', pp. 387-88.
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an outcome that seems legally incorrect. Thus, imagine a scenario in which
Munzer's legislature sought to restrict whaling simply in order to oppress
an ethnic minority for whom whaling was the primary livelihood. We
would presumably agree that the 'fish' statute does indeed restrict whaling
notwithstanding both its literal meaning and immoral character. Munzer's
challenge would remain essentially unanswered.
In a similar vein, one might characterize some factor as a reserve deter-
minant of legal meaning, to be used in the event of conflict between other
determinants. In addition to the prospect of cases in which that factor
ought to be decisive but in fact implies a counter-intuitive outcome, such a
characterization would be at risk of seeming arbitrary; how could a factor
determine a result notwithstanding a contrary indication from either literal
meaning or legislative purpose but not have any impact where such factors
are in agreement? Our legal intuitions are hardly so sensitive as to cease to
respond to the reserve factor altogether in such an event. Very often a provi-
sion's literal meaning and legislative purpose entail the same outcome and
all agree that it is obviously correct. On some such occasions the reserve
factor will indicate a contrary result. When it does, we go from general
agreement on its indications' correctness (the regulation of whaling under
the original 'fish' statute), to thinking its indications obviously incorrect.
This would seem a curiously sharp contrast in our response to a determi-
nant of legal meaning.
The alternative is to posit that the weight of a determinant of legal
meaning varies with the provision in question. This strategy avoids the
problem of counter-intuitive legal outcomes but at considerable cost. If
the weight of a supposed determinant varies from provision to provision,
we will struggle to account for broad interpretive agreement in cases of
conflict between determinants, such as that induced by the Munzer sce-
narios. How were interpreters to know what weights the determinants were
to have so as to venture with such confidence what the correct interpreta-
tion should be? Conversely, for questions such as the constitutionality of
the death penalty, the very sort of legal disagreement whose explanation is
said to motivate causal legal semantics, how were interpreters to know that
the weights were so finely balanced as to permit the occurrence of mean-
ingful legal disagreement? Interpreters could hardly be said to be following
past patterns. Should they in fact know how some past conflict was resolved,
they must have some means of identifying correct interpretations which
does not require attributing weights to specified factors. Identifying that
means would provide a simpler explanation for the occurrence of both
interpretive agreement and meaningful disagreement than a hypothesis
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which adds a role for a further set of factors. Preserving causal legal seman-
tics from counterexamples by characterizing literal meaning as a co-
determinant of varying weight strips the theory of its explanatory value.^'
Literal Meaning as Default Legal Meaning
An alternative response to Munzer's challenge is to claim that a provision's
literal meaning does not count towards its legal meaning should it be
apparent that its terms were not intended literally.22 if, as in Munzer's
hypothetical, it is obvious that the legislature intended to regulate a class of
objects not denoted by its adopted terms, literal meaning is immaterial.
Legally speaking, the statute refers as clearly intended. This response seems
to deal well with the objection that what is legally obvious, e.g., the quota
on whaling, may be counter-semantic. Consider Scott Soames' historical
example:
The case turns on whether tomatoes count as vegetables rather than fruits,
and so are subject to a tariff on vegetables that excludes fruits. The issue is
whether the meaning of the word 'fruit' excludes all vegetables, while including
the edible 'ripened seed-bearing ovary of the plant,' as my dictionary puts it -
thereby precluding tomatoes ...^'
Soames considers how one might answer the legal question if the word,
'"fruit", like other natural kind terms, had only a single "scientific" mean-
ing',2'* i.e., if its literal meaning just denoted the edible, ripened, seed-bear-
ing ovary of the plant:
On this hypothesis, the literal meaning of the statutory language excludes
tomatoes from the tax. Nevertheless... [t]he content of the statute is what the
lawmakers asserted and committed themselves to, in adopting the statutory
language. If, as seems plausible, they were using the terms 'fruit' and 'vegetable'
referentially - on analogy with referential uses of descriptions - then they
2' The same applies to conventionalist legal literalism; see Brian Flanagan, 'Revisiting the
Contribution of Literal Meaning to Legal Meaning', Oxfordjoumal of Legal Studies 30 (2010)
PP- 255-71.260,267-69.
22 See Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, 'Word Meaning in Legal Interpretation', San Diego Law
Review 42 (2005) pp. 465-92, 486, 'Word meaning might even still be primary in the sense
tha t laws should be interpreted by their common word meanings. . . except when . . . it should
he clear to all or most citizens tha t the legislators did not intend the literal word meaning.'
23 Soames, Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It p. 407.
^ Soames, Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It p. 408.
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thereby asserted, among other things, that tomatoes, cucumbers, and peas are
subject to the tax, even if they misdescribed
Since it is obvious that the legislature intended to tax tomatoes, it is clear
why we agree that tomatoes are subject to the tax. Conversely, legal dis-
agreements may still be explained as the product of interpretive efforts to
establish a provision's literal meaning. Thus, if literal meaning is default
legal meaning, then, absent a clear intention to the contrary, a provision
regulating the hunting of'tigers' applies to just those creatures holding the
particular similarity relation shared by agreed upon instances of the term
'tiger'. Conceivably, a dispute could emerge as to whether some animal is
regulated by the provision notwithstanding its failure to possess a set of
characteristics conventionally associated with tigerhood. Whereas conven-
tionalist legal literalism would struggle to account for this possibility, the
causal theory would not - given the potential opacity of the relevant simi-
larity relation, the criteria conventionally associated with tigerhood may be
mistaken.
Nevertheless, some disputes remain mysterious. If a provision legally
applies to a counter-semantic class of object (such as tomatoes or whales)
only where, 'it is clear to all', that legislators intended the regulation of that
class of object, it follows that whether a statute regulates objects other than
those it literally denotes is not a subject for disagreement.^^ Thus, if the
only objects to which a legislature may non-obviously refer are those liter-
ally denoted by the terms in which its statute is written, disagreement over
whether the statute regulates objects its terms clearly do not denote seems
impossible.
In Munzer's statute, the term 'fish' was obviously used to refer to whales.
But this might be only part of the story. Munzer's legislators may have
intended the term to refer to an alternative natural kind, say, marine
animals.^^ Membership of this kind would seem a matter of natural fact.
5^ Soames, Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It p. 410.
^^  Soames, Natural Language: What It Means and How We Use It p. 409. Notwithstanding
a fleeting reference to the necessary transparency of counter-semantic intentions (in dis-
cussing the referential use of Donnellan's description, 'the man in the comer drinking cham-
pagne is a famous philosopher'), Soames is more fairly characterized as holding that legal
meaning is a function of legislative intentions simpliciter; '[T]he content of the taw includes
everything asserted and conveyed in adopting the relevant legal texts.' Id 408-09 (emphasis
in original).
•" '[T]o say that there can he no principled exclusion of whales is to say that the issue is
not about what it is to be a fish. The mistaken theory of fish-hood prevalent when the statute
was drafted explains why the word 'fish' was mistakenly used to pick out marine life. Again,
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something about which people may be generally ignorant or mistaken. If
Munzer's legislators intended to regulate just the harvesting of such crea-
tures, we might favour a reading of the statute according to which a species
is protected just in case it is an animal kind adapted to marine life, regard-
less of whether legislators or initial interpreters had thought it such.
Nineteenth century officials might well have mistaken coral and sea anem-
one for plant rather than animal life, and hence as outside the scope of the
provision. Yet subsequent interpreters might claim the legislative quota
had in fact always been applicable to tbose species. It would seem tbat a
provision migbt thus carry a counter-semantic, yet nevertheless 'scientific',
legal meaning.
Consider an actual example: the First Amendment to the US Constitu-
tion states that 'Congress shall make no law ... abridging the fi-eedom
of speech ...'.^^ The Amendment's literal meaning implies that everyone
capable of speecb enjoys protection from Congress. The implication is at
odds with the Amendment's accepted legal meaning. For instance, sus-
pected enemy combatants held in Guantanamo Bay are excluded from
First Amendment protection,^^ and non-citizen residents can be deported
for speecb tbat would be protected bad tbey been citizens.^" Insofar as
Congress may constitutionally limit the speech of certain speakers, the
class of individuals protected by the Amendment is counter-semantic. Yet
disagreement as to the identity ofthat (counter-semantic) class is currently
raging through American law reviews. Take the question of whether orily
the political speech of natural persons qualifies for protection.
In the opinions accompanying the US Supreme Court's recent 5:4 ruling
that campaign finance regulation violates corporations' and unions' consti-
tutional right to political speech, the question of whether natural person-
hood is a necessary condition for such First Amendment protection was
central.^' The ensuing controversy did not arise from a misunderstanding
"fish" in the statute does not stand for a special legal concept somewhat like, yet different
than, fish. Rather, "fish" stands for marine life or something to that effect' Stavropotilos,
Objectivity in Law p. 192.
^ (Emphasis added).
28 http://wvnvi.voanews.com/english/news/middle-east/US-Military-Panel-Hears-ist
--Guantanamo-Appeal-82696517.html (accessed 21 December, 2010).
3° See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy 342 US 580 (1952).
3' Citizens United v. FEC 558 US _ (2010), 'By taking the right to speak from some and
giving it to others, the Government [hereby] deprives the disadvantaged person or ciass of
the right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's
voice... [The] political speech of corporations or other associations should [not] be treated
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of the Amendment's literal meaning, and seemed distinctively legal, rather
than merely moral or policy-based. Yet the existence of the controversy is
mysterious if the Amendment's legal application departs from its literal
meaning only in cases where its intended meaning is, 'clear to all'. The First
Amendment's literal meaning implies that political speakers are protected.
But the question, 'who is a political speaker', is not what Justices argued over
in their debate on campaign finance regulation; the issue, rather, was
whether the class oi protected political speaker was limited to natural polit-
ical speakers. If the legal meaning of the Amendment is opaque on this
point, the opacity is not a function of its literal meaning - it being agreed
that corporations and unions are political speakers.
Treating literal meaning as default legal meaning seems likely to pro-
duce outcomes which correspond with our intuitions as to what is obvi-
ously legally the case (e.g., whaling quotas, even those racially motivated),
while allowing for the meaningfulness of disagreements concerning the
nature of a kind literally denoted by statutory language. But the qualifica-
tion appears inconsistent with the scope of legal disagreement. It seems to
overlook the possibility of meaningful disagreement over the application of
statutes to entities which all agree are, or all agree are not, literally denoted
by their terms. Our example of the latter concerned the possible applica-
tion of Munzer's 'fish' statute to the harvesting of sea anemone and coral;
the contemporary disagreement over the protection of corporate speakers
fi-om laws abridging political 'speech' is an example of the former.
Characterizing literal meaning as default legal meaning thus ignores a
salient aspect of our legal practice - that aspect with which advocates of
causal legal semantics are most concerned.
As a Creation of Legislators
Nicos Stavropoulos offers the most detailed elaboration of the application
of CTR to legal interpretation. Taking 'concept-words' such as 'vehicle' and
differently under the First Amendment simply because such associations are not "natural
persons."' (Opinion of the Court, emphasis added); 'The conceit that corporations must
be treated identically to natural persons In the political sphere is not only inaccurate
but also inadequate to justify the Court's disposition of this case ... The fact that corpora-
tions are different from human beings might seem to need no elaboration, except that the
majority opinion almost completely elides it.' (Stevens J, joined by Breyer, Ginsburg and
SotomayorJJ).
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'cruelty' as, 'the key semantic unit',^ ^ Stavropoulos defends a 'Kripke-Putnam
semantics for law'.^ ^ Kripke-Putnam semantics is said to, 'determine[] the
extension, or range of application' of legal concepts,^* thereby explaining
the possibility of meaningful legal disagreement as the product of the inter-
pretive effort to establish the statute's causally determined literal mean-
ing.35 Earlier we noted Stavropoulos' observation that legislators might use
a term such as 'fish' intending to refer to a natural kind other than fish.
Stavropoulos reconciles this possibility with his initial claim that a provi-
sion's semantic properties determine its legal application by characterizing
legislators as themselves Kripkean baptizers:
The best explanation, then, of legal practice shovvfs that lawyers treat legal
properties as genuine properties over v^ fhich not only lawyers in general but
the original 'reference-fixers' (the legislators) may be in substantive error.^^
Presumably, Munzer's notional legislators had certain creatures in mind for
their quota. On Stavropoulos' approach, the legal meaning of their statute
is a function of the reference of its terms, where the latter is determined by
the similarity relation in fact holding between legislators' paradigms, the
content of which may be unknown. The literal reference of 'fish', as used in
the statute, is fixed on whatever shares the nature of legislators' paradigms,
which include, in this case, whale.^ ^ If the statute's literal meaning deter-
mines its legal application, then, given Stavropoulos' understanding of
its literal meaning, it should be both uncontroversial that it regulates
whaling and potentially controversial that it regulates the taking of, say,
sea anemone.
Treating legislators as Kripkean baptizers is costly on two fronts, how-
ever. The notion of legislative enactment as an act of linguistic baptism or
reference-fixing is sharply at odds with our ordinary understanding; enac-
tors do not view themselves in the role of baptizers, nor does the public or
legal community generally. Certainly, some legal norms become named
after the titles of statutory provisions, e.g., 'Section 4 Rape'. But, in such
cases, the name has just become shorthand for the legal norm; no one
^^  Stavropoulos Objectivity in Law p. l.
ä^ Stavropoulos Objectivity in Law p. 4.
^* Stavropoulos Objectivity in Law p. 2.
ä5 Stavropoulos Objectivity in Law p. 4-5.
^^  Stavropoulos Objectivity in Law p. 46. Compare Stavropoulos' discussion of the 'act of
baptism'; id 25-26.
^' See n 27.
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thinks it determines the norm's content. Poetic licence is not something
associated with legislative drafting.
The second cost incurred is a blurring of the intuitive distinction
between a speaker's meaning and literal meaning. The idea that legislators
may mean something that their words do not literally express is a highly
plausible one. Yet, if the natural kind literally denoted by a statutory term is
fixed to objects legislators regard as exemplars of what they seek to regu-
late, it would never be the case that legislators intend to regulate a natural
kind not denoted by the literal meaning of their adopted terms.
Whatever our theory of a statute's legal meaning, we will occasionally
want to differentiate between what legislators meant to regulate and what
their legislation literally entails. Unfortunately, Stavropoulos' proposal
restricts our ability to make tbis distinction. Thus, we would like to be able
to say of a statute regulating, 'the sale of precious metals', both that its literal
meaning entails the regulation of valuable radioactive metals, such as plu-
tonium and uranium, and that its authors had intended just to regulate the
sale of valuable non-radioactives sucb as gold and silver. Plausibly, the
legislators regard metals such as gold and silver as exemplars of the natural
kind to be regulated. If the statute's literal meaning is the kind of which
these metals are exemplars, we could not say that its literal meaning is at
odds with the kind legislators intended to regulate, whereas that seems a
strong possibility. Certainly, Stavropoulos can say that non-radioactive pre-
cious metal is the kind of thing to which the statute properly applies, just as
he may say that marine Hfe is the kind of thing to which Munzer's statute
applies. The difficulty is that he cannot also say that its terms literally
denote certain radioactive metals, such as uranium. But we think that we
should be able to do both. As Soames puts it regarding the referential use of
descriptions:
[I]n situations in which a description The F is used referentially to pick out an
object which is G, but which is not in fact F, the natural thing to say about a
speaker who has uttered The F is C ... is that although the speaker has said
something that is literally false, namely that the F is G, he has also said
something true, namely that the individual is G.^ ^
We have reviewed three ways in which causal legal semantics might be
elaborated to accommodate common intuitions about legal meaning. Each
adjustment fell short of that goal. I shall now argue that explaining legal
ää Soames, 'Donnellan's Referential/Attributive Distinction', Philosophical Studies 73
(1994) PP-149-68,154 (emphasis in original).
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disagreement as a function of the literal meanings of moral terms requires,
but lacks, a causal semantics clearly consistent with the scope of moral
disagreement.
Causal Semantics and the Scope of Moral Disagreement
[W]ith words like 'malice' deference to the legislature does not require that a
court abjure from seeking what it elsewhere seeks: the true nature of the thing
to which the word refers. That the task here involves moral knowledge is no
reason to change the nature of that task.^ ^
We noted at the outset that causal legal semantics is motivated by the per-
ceived inability of its conventionalist cousin to account for the scope of
legal disagreement. Until now, we have focused on the theory's application
to non-moral statutory language. But legal disagreement may also occur
over the interpretation of statutes written in moral terms, terms such as
'due', 'cruel' or 'fair'. For proponents of causal legal semantics, such disagree-
ment is a predictable product of moral inquiry into the true nature of the
moral kinds causally denoted by such terms. That assumption depends,
however, on a story of how a term ( may come to causally denote a particu-
lar moral kind that clearly accounts for disagreement over what counts as t.
Without one, the assumption that the reference of moral terms is causally
determined cannot explain disagreement over the legal meaning of a stat-
ute featuring t. In this section, I suggest that we lack such a story.
Paradigmatic Reference-fbdng
The process by which a sound type becomes associated with a meaning is
central to semantic theory. CTR's basic account of this process is clear
enough; a sound type is associated with a particular kind through a cere-
mony in which agreed upon objects which share a special sort of similarity
relation are dubbed with the type, and in which it is stipulated that other
objects will count as instances of the kind if and only if they share that rela-
tion. The associated kind becomes (one of) the sound type's meaning(s).
There are some well-known difficulties with this account.**" But, at least
39 Moore, 'A Natural Law Theory of Legal Interpretation', p. 383.
'"' See n 13 ahove.
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for terms denoting obviously natural kinds like gold or fish, the account is
plausibly consistent with the possibility of meaningftil disagreement over
which objects count as instances. Since the content of the relevant similar-
ity relation may be unknown or misapprehended, we can expect substan-
tive debates as scientists work to identify it.*'
Although Putnam himself once suggested that one ought, 'to apply a
generally causal account of reference also to moral terms','*^ the process by
which their reference may be causally determined remains obscure. Tbus,
in principle, there could be some set of objects of which all competent
speakers would say, 'if anything is an instance of water, these are'. Something
similar might plausibly be said of gold and tigers, and so on. Granting tbis,
it seems possible to claim, à la Kripke and Putnam, that the reference of
such terms is determined by the shared nature of certain stipulated
paradigms.
In contrast, however, it seems open to competent speakers to fail to com-
monly regard any action or decision as an example of, say, moral goodness.
There is some evidence for this impression in the breadth of contemporary
and historical moral disagreement. But the contrast rests not on the breadtb
of the genuine moral disagreement that has occurred, but on tbe apparent
conceivability of such disagreement witb respect to any moral question.
That is, it seems that anything offered as paradigmatic of moral goodness
might be intelligibly characterized as not morally good. This possibility
undermines the idea that the reference of'moral goodness' may be fixed to
paradigm instances of tbe kind moral goodness just as the reference of'gold'
may be fixed to paradigm instances of the kind gold. For 'moral goodness',
competent speakers seem at large to argue over the kind's membership. For
natural kind terms, conversely, it seems plausible to suggest that we are in
principle ready to recognize objects whose membership may not be intel-
ligibly disputed.
Epistemic Reference-ñxing
Presumably in ligbt of the unavailability of linguistic paradigms for moral
terms, no-one has suggested a direct application of the paradigmatic model
of reference-fixing to moral vocabulary. Philosophers attracted to causal
*' See Putnam, 'The Meaning of Meaning', p. 142 (our understanding of what counts as
'water' is defeasible, liable to be revised in light of future investigation).
*^ Putnam, Mind, Language, and Reaiity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975)
p. 290.
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moral semantics have instead pursued an epistemic theory of referencing-
fixing. Richard Boyd offers the leading account:
[A] term t refers to a kind (property, relation, etc.) k just in case there exist
causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it about, over time, that what
is predicated of the term ( will be approximately true oik... Such mechanisms
•mW typically include the existence of procedures which are approximately
accurate for recognizing instances of k (at least for easy cases) and which
relevantly govern the use of í... t refers to k (in nondegenerate cases) just in
case the socially coordinated use of ( provides significant epistemic access to
k, and not to other kinds (properties, etc.) "^
On an epistemic account of reference-fixing, the term 'evil' refers to the
moral kind evil as long as we use procedures to identify evil that are more or
less accurate, at least in easy cases, and name what we identify as 'evil'.'*'* If
such procedures are in place, meaningfial disagreement about what 'evil'
refers to can be expected: Will this refinement to the procedure for recog-
nizing instances of evil make us more accurate than that refinement?
Does this conclusion about what is evil follow from that clear example of
evil?, etc.
Disagreement about what principle follows from easy cases of evil
can also be accommodated by conventionalist moral semantics."*^ The
distinctive promise of the epistemic theory of reference-fixing is its ability
"3 Boyd, 'How To Be a Moral Realist in Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.). Essays on Moral
Realism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 181-228,195.
"" Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons offer a different gloss, attributing to Boyd a
'Causal regulation thesis: For each moral term t (e.g., "good"), there is a natural property N,
such that N and N alone causally regulates the use of t by humans'. Horgan & Timmons,
'Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The "Open Question Argument" Revived',
Philosophical Papers 21 (1992), pp. 153-75,159. Horgan and Timmons' subsequent elaboration
of GE Moore's open question argument into a rebuttal of Boyd's account postulates the exis-
tence of another human population on a different planet, 'Twin Earthlings', for whom ( is
causally regulated by a diffierent natural property and with whom Earthlings could have
conversations involving í that express genuine moral disagreement. This has led to a digres-
sion about whether Putnam's 'Water' Twin Earth and H&T's 'Moral' Twin Earth are truly
analogous; see, e.g.; S. Laurence et al., 'Moral Realism and Twin Earth', Facía Philosophica
1 (1999). PP- 135-65 (critiquing the analogy); M. Rubin, 'Sound Intuitions on Moral Twin
Earth', Philosophical Studies 138 (2008), pp. 307-27 (responding).
*^ See, e.g., F. Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 139-62. Jackson's account postulates the possibil-
ity of deriving a mature folk morality from critical reflection on current folk beliefs about
what counts as 'morally right'. The mature folk morality constitutes 'the best we will do by
way of making good sense of the raft of sometimes conflicting intuitions about particular
cases and general principles that make up folk morality'; at 133. The natural propert(ies)
playing the role which the folk's mature morality attributes to moral rightness determine the
meaning of the folk's moral terms.
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to account for the sense that, sometimes, the solutions to disagreements
over what counts as 'evil' do not simply follow from an underlying shared
criterion as to what counts as 'evil', e.g., from the mature folk morality, but
from what evil actually is.
On Boyd's causal semantics, the reference of a moral term t is causally
determined by a particular moral kind k if speakers by and large identify k
and refer to its instances as 'i*.*^  Unfortunately, the scope of moral disagree-
ment remains a challenge. Imagine two communities, one in which the
socially coordinated use of t provides significant epistemic access to k, and
one in which the socially co-ordinated use of t provides little or no such
access. With respect to the moral status of a given action, t as used by a
speaker of the former community seems liable to express a meaningful dis-
agreement with speakers of the latter community. The ease with which we
can imagine the two sorts of community disagreeing in this way is signifi-
cant. It suggests that we do not regard the reference of a moral term to be
determined by a particular moral kind merely because speakers by and
large identify that kind and use the term to refer to its instances. If, as the
scenario's credibility suggests, competence with moral terms is not the pre-
serve of those with moral knowledge, how may a community's moral
knowledge be thought to determine the reference of its moral terms?
I have just suggested that the leading account of the application of CTR
to moral terms struggles to accommodate the scope of moral disagreement
It may be that, on the whole, the relative advantages of a causal moral
semantics are such that its difficulty in explaining the scope of moral dis-
agreement is a price worth paying. It is not, however, a price that those
seeking a semantics with which to explain the scope of legal disagreement
can afford. Until the development of an account which clearly is consistent
with moral disagreement, CTR cannot underwrite explanations of legal dis-
agreement as a function of the literal meaning of enacted moral language.
'*" Mark van Roojen has recently suggested improving Boyd's account by making it agnos-
tic on the issue of causal determination; van Roojen, 'Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New
Response to the Moral Twin Earth Argument', Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1 (2006), pp. 161-
92. Van Roojen reformulates accordingly; 'If enough people in a community get enough
things right about a property, so that in principle there is available to all speakers in a com-
munity an epistemic pathway to finding out more about that property, then all members of
that community can be credited with thoughts and talk about that property, even if some of
what they say is false and even necessarily false.' At 189. Note that the problem to be identi-
fied with Boyd's original account applies equally to van Roojen's version, namely, the failure
of moral linguistic competence to correlate with a community's moral knowledge.
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In the final section, I consider the potential contribution of CTR's theo-
retical apparatus of paradigms and similarity relations to intentionalist
explanations of legal practice.
Intended Paradigms and Legal Disagreement
Legal intentionalism is the theory that the legal meaning of the statute
book is primarily a function of its autbors' legislative intentions. My aim is
not to defend that theory here. I will simply consider whether an appeal to
paradigms and similarity relations may account for the scope of legal
disagreement more effectively as part of an intentionalist, rather than
semantic, legal theory.
The author of a provision might intend that it regulate the kind most
naturally unifying certain exemplars. Its legal meaning might accordingly
be seen as a function of the similarity relation holding between these
intended paradigms, something about which interpreters and legislators
themselves may be ignorant. Witb tbis hypothesis, the legal intentionalist
might hope to account for the possibility of genuine disagreement over the
provision's legal meaning. The hypothesis is distinct from Stavropoulos'
claim that a provision's legal meaning is a ñinction of its literal meaning as
causally determined by legislators' paradigms. Unlike tbe latter, the inten-
tionalist hypothesis does not require us to adopt an unnatural characteriza-
tion of legislators as word coiners. Likewise, the hypothesis permits us to
distinguish the natural kind which a provision literalfy denotes from the
natural kind to which it is intended to apply. If legislators' exemplars of the
kind regulated by a provision appear to bear a similarity relation distinct
from tbat denoted by the term adopted, we may simply say that legislators'
use of language was imperfect. Recall our notional 'precious metals' statute.
Legislators' paradigms being gold and silver, the natural kind the statute
regulates is (precious) non-radioactive metal; but it remains true to say
that, given their literal meaning, the provision's terms were ill-chosen.
I argued earlier that the notion of literal meaning as default legal mean-
ing is inconsistent with disagreement over whether something generally
accepted as literally denoted by the adopted terms is actually regulated -
and vice versa. But that notion may be detached from the suggestion,
implicit in Soames' discussion of the 'fruit' statute, that legislators may
intend to enact a provision's causally determined, 'scientific', literal mean-
ing. Stripped of the requirement that intended departures from literal
meaning be 'clear to all', Soames' suggestion coheres with the claim that
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legal meaning is primarily a function of legislative intentions. Likewise, the
suggestion is consistent with the possibility of disagreement over a provi-
sion's legal application to entities which all agree are, or which all agree are
not, literally denoted by its terms. However, though consistent with such
disagreement, Soames' suggestion does not provide intentionalism with
the resources to explain it. The possibility that legislators might intend to
enact a provision's (causally determined) literal meaning does not account
forgenuine legaldisagreementover, say, the extent of the First Amendment's
protection of political speech, or over the taking of sea anemone under the
'fish' statute.
Now consider the explanatory power of the hypothesis that a provision's
legal meaning may be a function of its author's intention that it regulate the
kind most naturally unifying certain exemplars. If interpreters were seeking
the shared nature of legislators' intended paradigms of the kind protected,
say, that of the pamphleteer and the soap box, or that of whales and sar-
dines, we could expect a meaningful argument over whether their shared
natures include corporate political speakers and sea anemone, respectively.
The intentionalist might thus characterize a controversy over First
Amendment protection for corporate political speakers as one concerning
the true nature of the kind of political speaker reflected in the Framers'
paradigms.*'' That sort of explanation could not be grounded on the possi-
bility that a provision's Uteral meaning may be intended, since everyone
agrees that the kind of political speaker protected by the Amendment,
whatever it is, is not that denoted by its literal meaning. The same applies
to our notional controversy over the protection of sea anemone. Insofar as
they may explain the scope of legal disagreement, then, the deployment of
paradigms and similarity relations in legal theory seems best decoupled
from their role in explaining statutes' literal meaning.
A further advantage of an intentionalist exploitation of paradigms
and similarity relations is that it permits them to be plausibly applied
to provisions written in moral terms. In the last section we argued that
CTR cannot underwrite explanations of legal disagreement as a function
of the literal meaning of enacted moral language until the development of
a causal semantics of moral terms which clearly accommodates moral
"' See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU 521 U.S. 844 (1997), 'Through the use of chat rooms, any person
with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could
from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same
individual can become a pamphleteer.' Stevens j , joined by Justices Thomas, Breyer, Souter,
Ginsburg, Scatia and Kennedy.
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disagreement. By contrast, the suggestion that legal disagreement is due to
the opacity of the similarity relation holding between legislators' para-
digms of the kind to be regulated awaits no such development.
Recall our discussion of the challenge facing a paradigmatic account of
how the reference of moral terms is fixed. We observed that the moral sta-
tus of any action offered as a paradigm instance of'moral goodness' is open
to be being intelligibly disputed. In contrast, the extent of disagreement
over the legal meaning of a particular provision, even one written in moral
terms, is often narrow. Even with respect to statutes whose interpretation is
heavily disputed, there is usually a range of interpretive claims that no com-
petent, disinterested interpreter would deny.
We considered earlier the example of the Eighth Amendment, which
prohibits the infliction of'cruel and unusual punishments'. Notwithstanding
any legal provision, of course, meaningful disagreement over the morality
of punishments such as the thumbscrew is possible. In light of that possi-
bility, use of the thumbscrew seems unavailable as a paradigm to wbicb to
fix tbe literal reference of tbe word 'cruelty'. Conversely, it seems certain
that the authors of the Eighth Amendment intended to prohibit use of the
thumbscrew, among other medieval tortures, and that any contrary inter-
pretation would be legally incorrect.*^ Although merely conventional clas-
sifications also have obvious instances, it is plausible that the Framers saw
such tortures as paradigmatic of the moral character of the punishments
they intended to prohibit. The precise moral character of those paradigms
is bound to be a controversial question, one about wbicb everyone, includ-
ing tbe Framers, might seem mistaken. The legal intentionalist might thus
characterize the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment as a matter of
determining the shared moral salience of the Framers' exemplars of the
kind of punishment to be prohibited. Genuine disagreement over tbe con-
stitutionality of, say, capital punisbment, could then be expected, notwitb-
standing the scope of disagreement over what literally counts as 'cruel'.
The point is not that a legal intentionalist appeal to paradigms and
similarity relations definitively solves the problem of legal disagreement
over provisions v^ritten in moral language. It is simply that the appeal is
more credible tban one wbich is parasitic on their ability to explain such
terms' literal meaning. For agreed paradigms to exist, disagreement must
*^ As Ronald Dworkin once put it, 'If the [US Supreme] Court finds that the death pen-
alty is cruel, it must do so on the basis of some principles or groups of principles that unite
the death penalty with the thumbscrew and the rack'. Dworkin, 'Special Supplement: The
Jurisprudence of Richard Nixon', The New York Review of Books, 4 May 1972.
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be limited in a way that legal disagreement appears to be and in which
moral disagreement does not. The legal literalist requires a story of how her
semantics accommodates the scope of moral disagreement. The legal
intentionalist, by contrast, need only worry about explaining the scope of
legal disagreement.
Conclusion
Explaining the occurrence of meaningful legal disagreement as a function
of the causally determined literal meanings of statutory provisions over-
looks important features of legal practice. Reflection on Munzer's 'fish'
hypothetical suggests that causal legal semantics struggles to explain com-
mon intuitions about legal meaning. Equally, reflection on the ability of
CTR to account for the scope of moral disagreement suggests that its theo-
retical apparatus of paradigms and similarity relations might better explain
the scope of legal disagreement as part of a traditional intentionalist theory
of legal practice.
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